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Statement of Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated section 78-2-2. 
Statement of issues presented for review and standard of review 
The first issue presented is the did the trial court err in his denial of Mr. 
Hogue's motion the suppress. The Standard of review for such cases is set 
forth in 2005 P.3d (2005 UT App 145); State v. Alverez; 2005 UT App 145 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f 8 Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to 
suppress. 
We review the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant 
or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous standard. 
However, we review the trial court's conclusions of law based on these 
findings for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial 
judge's application of the legal standard to the facts. 
State v. Veteto. 2000 UT62,f 8, 6P.3dll33 (quotations and citations 
omitted). "The measure of discretion afforded varies, however, according to 
the issue being reviewed." State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125,f26, 63 P.3d 650. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hen a case involves the 
reasonableness of a search and seizure, 'we afford little discretion to the 
district court because there must be state-wide standards that guide law 
enforcement and prosecutorial officials.'" State v. Warren. 2003 UT 36,f 12. 
78P.3d5,90 (quoting Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at <R26). More recently, the Utah 
Supreme Court "abandoned] the standard which extended 'some deference' 
to the application of law to the underlying factual findings in search and 
seizure cases in favor of non[]deferential review." State v. Brake. 2004 UT 
95,^15, 103P.3d699. Because this case involves a search and seizure, we 
do not extend any deference to the trial court in its application of the law to 
its factual findings. 2005 R3d (2005 UT App 145); State v. Alverez; 2005 
UT App 145 
The second issue presented Whether the detention of Mr. Hogue was a level 
two or level 3 detention as apposed to a level one detention under the Terry 
standards. The standard of review is "correctness" State v. Hansen. 17 P.3d 
i 
1135 (Utah App 2000). 
The third issue presented is whether Mr. Hogue was denied effective 
assistance of counsel, when his counsel failed to object to the introduction 
of expert testimony without meeting the standards of Utah Rules of 
Evidence 701 and 702. 2006 E3d (2006 UT App 71); State v, Perez-Avila; 
2006 UT App 71 Provides that the defendant must meet the two prongs of 
the Strickland test. 
The Fourth issue is whether the trial court committed plain error when it 
allowed expert testimony without following the requirements of Utah Rules 
of Evidence 701 and 702 and relevant caselaw. The standard of review is 
abuse of discretion. See Hardy v. Hardy, 776P.2d917, 925 (Utah Ct App. 
1989). 
Applicable Statutes and Rules 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as interpreted and 
applied under Utah law. 
Rule 701 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
Statement of the case 
This case is an appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress evidence. 
The Defendant preserved his right to appeal the decision of the trial court in 
his subsequent plea arrangement. (Minutes for jury trial record pages 128-
129 Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea record pages 116-
127). 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence, the trial court 
heard testimony from both Officer Leonard Issacson, the arresting officer 
and from John Lee Hogue the defendant. 
The trial court did not suppress the evidence after the hearing. 
The questions before this Court are whether Mr. Hogue ?s rights to be 
free from unlawful search and seizure were violated: Whether his counsel 
was ineffective; and whether the trial court committed plain error. 
Facts 
Officer Leonard Issacson was investigating a vehicle burglary* He 
testified that the victim of the burglary, who he did not identify, told him 
that an individual by the name of David Sentie (phonetic), had been seen in 
the area of the vehicle burglary in the morning, and that he had been seen by 
someone going to the area of John Hogue's residence. Mr. Hogue is the 
Defendant herein. The officer testified that he saw Mr. Hogue's vehicle and 
signaled him to pull over by pointing to the side of the road. Mr. Hogue 
pulled over. Officer Issacson testified that he pulled Mr. Hogue over to see 
if Mr. Sentie was in his vehicle. (Transcript page 5). As soon as Officer 
Issacson went in front of the vehicle and before he exited his own vehicle, 
he could see that the only person in Mr. Hogue's vehicle was Mr. Hogue. 
Officer Issacson testified that he had all ready run a warrants check on Mr. 
Hogue which came back negative. Officer Issacson testified of no violation 
or purpose for pulling the vehicle over other than to check for Mr. Sentie. 
Even when Officer Issacson determined that Mr. Hogue was the only person 
in the vehicle he approached the vehicle, told Mr. Hogue to turn it off and 
told him to exit the vehicle. Officer Issacson noted that Mr. Hogue appeared 
nervous. Officer Issacson testified that he could not smell the odor of 
alcohol, he did not testify to any impaired driving, he did not testify to any 
lack of balance, erratic movements or anything of the sort. Officer Issacson 
testified that Mr. Hogue answered his questions. But, he appeared nervous. 
Officer Issacson told Mr. Hogue to empty his pockets. He did. Officer 
Issacson testified that he saw two small items still in one of Mr. Hogue's 
pockets, neither of which appeared to be a weapon to the officer. Officer 
Issacson testified that at this point he issued the Miranda warnings and told 
Mr. Hogue to remove the remaining items from his pockets. He removed "a 
little leather purse" (transcript p. 23 line 23) and one other item that was not 
identified at the hearing. (The recitation of facts was taken from the 
transcript pages 2-9, 12, and 18-23). 
The foregoing is the recitation of events by Officer Issacson. Mr. 
Hogue testified that he was told to get out of his truck and after answering a 
few questions about David Santie, he was patted down for weapons by 
Officer Issacson. Mr. Hogue also testified that he was wearing a long shirt, 
un-tucked, which covered his pants pockets. (Transcript pages 37, 41 and 
42). 
On cross examination Officer Issacson testified that he had observed 
no violations of the law by Mr. Hogue when he pulled him over. (Transcript 
page 25 lines 18-25 and page 26 lines 1 and 2). 
Argument 
The actions of Officer Issacson violated the search and seizure 
standards set forth in the constitution, the levels of police encounter as 
outlined in Terry v. Ohio, as interpreted and defined by out courts. 
From the testimony, it is clear that Officer Issacson had no authority 
to contact Mr. Hogue beyond a level one encounter. Officer Issacson 
testified that he was investigating a vehicle burglary that had occurred some 
time earlier. He testified that someone told him that David Santie had 
committed a vehicle burglary and that at some point someone had seen Mr. 
Santie walking in the direction of Mr. Hogue's residence. On that paucity of 
information Officer Issacson determined to locate Mr. Hogue and pull him 
over. 
Before pulling Mr. Hogue over Officer Issacson had confirmed that 
Mr. Hogue had no warrants. (Transcript page 9 lines 20,21). Officer 
Issacson testified that he noted no violations of the law by Mr. Hogue before 
he p jllcd him o\er. I Transcript page 25 lines 18-2* puge 26 lines 1-2; fie 
testified that he wanted to ask Mr, Hogue if he knew the whereabouts of 
David Saritie, (Iranscript page 9 lines 9-11). Nevertheless, Officer Issacson 
proceeded to detain Mr. Hogue well beyond the stated purpose of asking 
where Mr. Santie wast 
rheic «re scveicii leurnt wi^ cb that are aoplluibk to oui discussion 
State v Narsmjo, ?005 1 »rl App 111 lUtdh App 2005) is a e<*se where an 
officer was responding to a 911 call of someone looking into vehicles Fm 
Weber State officer responded tn the area a observed a person matching the 
description of the call. Mr. Naranio relused to stop at the officer's request 
ard subsequently committed a traffic offense. The Court is aware of tne 
xQctf*. 1 iut Ca^ e c<ime csown to a Gctenr«in«iiion tuGt t/«v ^ta:ta oi Mr, 
Nardil|0 vv&s in violation of his Foul to Amendment Rights Vh Niramo v-as 
placed in hand oufis and his person searched. I he officer claimed the ^«rcn 
%\u$ tor weapons, however he passed over the area that Mr, faaranjo was 
trying to keep him from searching The denial of Mr. Naranio's motion to 
suppress was reversed, 
State v. Brafre, 2*>04 I' j 9? ( U 20041 was o cafe im ohing « 
warrantless v,eapoiv sea*vh, hi t W u s e officer CostlebenV **^ tojidaunm 
a welfare cheek on two vehicles paik m a remote <*rca of Utah Coumv 
Officer Castleberry observed a possible curfew violation but nothing more 
at the time he conducted his search. In Mr. Hogue's case no violations of the 
law had been observed, and it was certainly not a welfare check. The Brake 
Court said in part. 
f 32 The weapons search approach also preserves the practical benefits 
derived by the similarities between the judgments required of law 
enforcement to justify a Terry frisk and those relevant to a weapons search. 
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A traditional Terry frisk requires that 
the officer have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the suspect is armed 
and dangerous. Id at 21-23. We have previously stated that "'reasonable 
suspicion requires an objectively reasonable belief that an individual is 
engaged in or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.1" Pen§> 869 R2d at 
940 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702-03 (1983)). In some 
cases, the circumstances surrounding the suspect may trigger the officer's 
reasonable suspicion, such as seeing a bulge that appears to be a weapon. In 
other cases, the nature of the crime being investigated is sufficient to trigger 
the officer's reasonable suspicion, such as a murder or robbery, However, we 
agree with our court of appeals that "Tor other types of crimes, such as 
trafficking in small quantities of narcotics, possession of marijuana,... 
underage drinking, driving under the influence and lesser traffic offenses, 
minor assault without weapons, or vagrancy,1 there must be particular facts 
which lead the officer to believe that a suspect is armed." State v. Warren, 
2001 UT App 346, % 15, 37 P.3d 270 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search 
and Seizure § 9.5(a), at 255-56 (3d ed. 1996)). Thus, the weapons exception 
ensures that an officer will search 
In the instant case, there was no articulable concern for officer safety during 
the time that Officer Issacson ordered Mr. Hogue to empty his pockets. In 
fact, just the opposite, Officer Issacson testified that he did not believe that 
Mr. Hogue was carrying a weapon at the time he was ordered to empty his 
pockets. (Transcript page 21 lines 5 and 6). (Note that Mr. Hogue testified 
that Officer Issacson had already patted him down [transcript page 35 lines 
3-10, page 36 lines 5-11 page 41 lines 23-25 page 42 lines 1-8 ] perhaps that 
explains why the officer had no concern for weapons.) 
The Uintah County case of State v. Mogen is also instructive, In that 
case Deputy Slaugh observed Mr. Mogen speeding. After issuing a verbal 
warning, Deputy Slaugh asked Mr. Mogen if he had any uguns drugs knives 
or bombs". When answered in the negative Deputy Slaugh asked if he could 
search anyway. In that case the trial court found that Mr. Mogen was still 
seized because of the officers actions, despite the fact that he had returned 
his license and registration. The subsequently received evidence was 
suppressed. The suppression was upheld. In Mr. Hogue's case, Deputy 
Issacson had motioned for him to pull over, had told him to turn off the 
engine to his pickup, and told him to exit the pickup. After that Deputy 
Issacson twice told Mr. Hogue to empty his pockets. (Note Mr. Hogue 
testified that Deputy Issacson had performed a pat down search and had 
removed items from Mr. Hogue's pocket before telling him to empty his 
pockets. Transcript pages 41-42). Mr. Hogue was more seized even than was 
Mn Mogen. The encounter ceased to be voluntary at the point Mr, Hogue 
was told to turn off the engine to his pickup. He was then told to exit the 
pickup, told to empty his pockets, told to empty his pockets again, 
challenged that he had not fully emptied his pockets then told to remove the 
remaining item(s) from his pockets. (Transcript pages 8 and 17-22). 
issue 2: the detention of Mr. Hogue was a level two or three detention. 
The testimony is uncontroverted that after Officer Issacson had pulled 
Mr, Hogue over he ordered him to turn off the engine to his vehicle and to 
exit the vehicle- He subsequently tells him to empty his pockets. All this 
with the stated intent to simply see if David Santie a suspect in a suspected 
auto burglary is in the pickup with Mr, Hogue. The actions of Officer 
Issacson were more than that of a level one Terry encounter. 
State v. Bean, 869 P2d 984 (Utah App 1994), discusses the levels of 
encounter. 
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged three levels of police 
encounters with the public that are constitutionally permissible: 
"(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose 
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his [or her] 
will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable 
suspicion1 that the person has committed or is about to commit a 
crime; however, the detention must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop1; (3) an officer 
may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being committed.tf 
State v Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (emphasis 
added) (quoting United States v. Merritt. 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984), 
cert denied sub nom, 476 U.S. 1142, 106 S.Ct. 2250, 90 L.Ed.2d 696 
(1986)), "These demarcations are easy to list but often difficult to apply. 
Consequently^ we must not only balance the competing interests of the 
individual and the State but also carefully consider the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case." State v. Menke, 787 R2d 537, 540 
(Utah App. 1990). 
A level one stop "is a voluntary encounter where a citizen may respond to an 
officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time." State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 
765, 767 (Utah App. 1990), cert denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); accord 
State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460,463 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 836 P.2d 
1383 (Utah 1992). "[A] seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment 
does not occur when a police officer merely approaches an individual on the 
street and questions him, 
if the person is willing to listen." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87—88 (Utah 
App.1987) (citing Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S~ 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 
1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). Such consensual, voluntary discussions 
between citizens and police officers are not seizures subject to Fourth 
Amendment protection. Jackson, 805 P.2d at 768. 
In contrast, a level two stop, or a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, occurs when the officer "'by means of physical force or show 
of authority has in some way restrained the liberty'" of a person. United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1876, 64 L.Ed.2d 
497 (1980) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1899 
n. 16, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); accord Trujillo, 739 R2d at 87. "When a 
reasonable person, based on the totality of the circumstances, remains, not 
in the spirit of cooperation with the officer's investigation, but because he 
believes he is not free to leave a seizure occurs." Trujillo. 739 P.2d at 87. 
"The test for when the seizure occurred is objective and depends on when 
the person reasonably feels detained, not on when the police officer thinks 
the person is no longer free to leave." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 
(Utah 1991); accord Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877; 
Jackson, 805 P.2d at 767. 
This court has recognized circumstances that, when considered in light of 
all other circumstances, tend to indicate a seizure has occurred: '"the 
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an 
officer, physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language 
or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might 
be compelled.'" Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 87 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 
554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877). 
It is helpful in this highly factual context to examine cases in which Utah 
courts have found level one stops, and compare them to our facts. In 
Bountiful City v. Maestas, 788 P.2d 1062 (Utah App. 1990), this court found 
a level one stop under circumstances similar to the case at issue. Two 
separate citizens informed an officer that an intoxicated person was at a 
nearby store asking for directions to the Utah State Liquor Store, and 
Page 
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provided the officer with a description of that person's vehicle. The officer 
drove to the liquor store, pulled alongside the defendant's vehicle, and made 
contact with the defendant, who was sitting in the driver's seat with the 
motor running. After the initial contact, the driver identified himself by 
giving the officer his driver's license. Soon thereafter and in the course of 
the subsequent conversation, the officer smelled alcohol on the defendant's 
breath. The officer asked the defendant if he would submit to field sobriety 
tests, to which the defendant agreed. After performing the tests the officer 
arrested the defendant Id. at 1063. 
Id. at 1064. 
Again, in State v. Deitman, the officer responded to a burglar alarm and 
followed a truck he observed pull away from the scene. When the occupants 
exited, the officer called to them and asked if he could speak to them. They 
crossed the street to the officer's vehicle and presented identification on 
request The officer requested a warrants check, which revealed an 
outstanding warrant against one of the defendants. Deitman, 739 R2d at 
617. In appealing their convictions, the defendants argued that the officer 
lacked probable cause for the initial stop and that the trial court thus erred in 
denying their motion to suppress. The court concluded the police encounter 
was a level one encounter. Id. at 618. 
It is also interesting to note that in all of those cases cited above there 
was the suspicion of ongoing or imminent criminal activity. This case 
involved the investigation of a vehicle burglary that had occurred some time 
earlier. 
Deputy Issacson's encounter with Mr. Hogue was a level 2 or 
three encounter. 
State v, Lopez, 873 R2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994) outlines a two 
/ / 
part inquiry to apply to such cases. 
However, '"what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, 
but unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 
S.Ct. 1868, 873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 
364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1446-47, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (I960)). To 
determine whether a search or seizure is constitutionally reasonable, we 
make a dual inquiry: (1) Was the police officer's action 
Page 
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"justified at its inception"? and (2) Was the resulting detention "reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the 
first place"? Id. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879. 
State v. Hansen, 17P.3d 1135, 1138-1139 (Utah App 2000) is a case 
where there was a valid traffic stop. After the reason for the stop was 
concluded his automobile was searched. The Court suppressed the evidence 
seized in the stop since Mr. Hansen was not free to leave and remained 
seized under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. The Court said in 
part: 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees 
the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const, 
amend. IV. The United States Supreme 
Page 
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Court has held that "stopping an automobile and detaining its 
occupants constitute^] a seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, "even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the 
resulting detention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). Thus, "[although a 
/ A, . 
person has a lesser expectation of privacy in a car than in his or her 
home, one does not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment 
while in an automobile." State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 
1989) (citation omitted). 
Who can argue that Mr. Hogue was free to leave? He had been 
ordered to turn off the engine to his vehicle and to exit the vehicle. 
Both for the stated purpose of simply inquiring the whereabouts of 
one David Sentie. Such an inquiry could be made at the window to 
the vehicle without the necessity of the extended detention here. 
The determination of whether a person is free to leave and is not 
seized does not depend on whether the officer says the person was 
free to leave, but depends on the circumstances and whether the 
person feels free to leave. State v. Mogen. 52 P.3d 462, 466 (Utah 
App 2002) reads in part; 
f l3 However, 
[ojnce a person is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, the seizure 
does not cease simply because the police formulate an 
uncommunicated intention that the seized person may go his or her 
way. For the seizure to end, it must be clear to the seized person, 
either from the words of an officer or from the clear import of the 
circumstances, that the person is at liberty to go about his or her 
business. 
Higgirn, 884 R2d at 1244 (citation omitted). 
Higgim, 884 R2d at 1244 (citation omitted). 
% 14 Other courts that have addressed similar issues have followed the same 
totality of the circumstances approach. See United States v. Elliott, 107 FJd 
8105 814 (10th Cir.1997) (evaluating whether encounter following a traffic 
stop was consensual under totality of the circumstances test of whether 
)3 
objective circumstances would demonstrate to reasonable person that he is 
no longer subject to detention by police); United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 
1404, 1408 (10th Cir.1990) (same); Commonwealth v. Stridden 563 Pa. 47, 
757 A.2d 884, 899 (2000) (same). In beginning their analyses, courts in 
other jurisdictions have determined that before a detention can end and a 
consensual encounter begin, an officer must return a driver's documentation. 
See Werking, 915 R2d at 1408—09 (after officer has returned driver license 
and registration, questions concerning drugs and weapons, or request for 
voluntary consent to search, may become "an ordinary consensual encounter 
between a private citizen and a law enforcement official."); Elliott, 107 F3d 
at 814 (same); People v. Cen?ante$~Arredondo, 17R3d 141, 148 (Colo. 
2001) (remanding back to trial court for determination of when defendant's 
documents 
Page 
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were returned and for finding concerning nature of interrogation), 
% 15 However, the mere return of the driver's documentation, alone, is not 
enough to show that the detention has de-escalated to a level-one, voluntary 
encounter. See Elliott 107 R3d at 814 {concluding that although officer 
must return a driver's documentation before detention can end, return of 
driver's documentation is not always sufficient to demonstrate that 
encounter has become consensual); Werking, 915 R2d at 1408 (concluding 
that return of driver's documents will not end detention if driver "has an 
objective reason to believe that he was not free to end his conversation with 
the law enforcement official and proceed on his way."). 
The actions of Deupty Issacson in this instance constitute at least a level 2 
encounter at the outset. Mr. Hogue is ordered to turn off the engine to his 
pickup, his means of leaving the encounter, and ordered out of the pickup. 
This for the sole purpose of asking where David Santie is? 
Officer Issacson also testified that he asked Mr. Hogue two times to empty 
his pockets. (Transcript page 28 lines 1-14). Officer Issacson's testimony is 
inconsistent with a level one encounter. 
Deputy Issacson testimony lacks credibility throughout the transcript. 
Some instances of note are: One Deputy Issacson claims no knowledge of 
Mr. Hogue, (trans p 9 lines 12-15) however he testified at page 5 line 14 and 
15 that he recognized Mr. Hogue's vehicle. During the hearing he also 
claimed a memory lapse on the important issues of whether he found any 
weapons? Officer Issacson says "I don't recall". (Transcript page 33 lines 
8-12). Yet at page 21 line 5-6 he testified "... I knew it wasn't a weapon". 
Officer Issacson also testified that he did not recall what Mr. Hogue was 
wearing at the time of the arrest. (Transcript page 26 lines 23-25). 
Ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Mr. Hogue's counsel while asking some very good questions during 
the course of the suppression hearing, failed to object to the use of 
testimony of an expert nature by and unqualified witness. Officer Issacson 
testified that he was not trained as a Drug Recognition Expert (Transcript 
pages 10-11), Nevertheless trial counsel did not object to the testimony that 
followed which was elicited from Deputy Issacson as if he were a Drug 
Recognition Expert. (Transcript pages 12-18 21-22). Trial counsel should 
have objected to proceeding without the trial court making the necessary 
findings to determine if the Deputy would quality as and expert and should 
have objected to the extensive testimony when Deputy Issacson testified 
that he had not completed his training and had not been qualified at the time 
of the encounter with Mr. Hogue. 
Interpreting and applying existing state and federal law the cases of 
State v- Rothlisberger; 2004 UT App 226 ALDER v. BAYER CORP 
State v. Draper; 2006 have since been decided outlining the parameters 
for the use and qualifications of expert witness and their testimony* 
The standard of review for raising the issue of ineffective assistance 
of counsel is found in State v. McCloud; 2005 UT App 466: 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
See State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49,f 18, 122 P3d 566 (stating that there are 
three instances when an issue may be raised for the first time on appeal: 
plain error, ineffective assistance of counsel, and exceptional 
circumstances). 
State v. Harper; 2006 UT App 178 (2006) 
State v. Malaga; 2006 UT App 103 
11
 Where, as here, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for 
the first time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it presents a 
question of law." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
"To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [Defendant] 
must show that (1) trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient and 
(2) there exists a reasonable probability that absent the deficient conduct, 
the outcome would likely have been more favorable to [Defendant]." State 
v. Meeham, 2000 UT App 2479f21$ 9 R3d 777 (citing Strickland v. 
IU 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). "The failure of counsel to make 
. . . objections which would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective 
assistance." State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96,f34, 989 R2d 52 (quotations and 
citation omitted). 
2006 P3d (2006 UT App 71); State v. Perez-Avila; 2006 UT App 71 
%6 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must meet both 
prongs of the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The Utah Supreme Court has held 
that to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the 
Strickland test, fffa defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and, 
second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant.1" Carter v. 
Galetka, 2001 UT 96,f31, 44 P3d 626 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 R2d 
516, 521 (Utah), cert- denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994) 
Without the extensive testimony of Deputy Issacson on the issues of 
Drug Recognition, there was no evidence to point to a reasonable suspicion 
to continue the detention of Mr. Hogue, That evidence was relied upon by 
the trial court in its decision to not suppress the evidence. (Transcript pages 
64-65), 
Plain error 
At the suppression hearing, Officer Issacson was permitted to testify 
as a Drug Recognition Expert. He was clearly not qualified to render 
testimony as an expert since by his own admission he had not been trained 
nor certified as such. (Transcript page 10 lines 6-23). 
The error is of such a nature that the District Court should not have 
allowed such testimony from Officer Issacson. Absent the claimed drug 
recognition, Officer Issacson had no reasons to detain Mr. Hogue. The 
officer had noted no generally recognized signs of impairment, such as 
slurred speech or lack of balance. He testified that he utilized Drug 
Recognition Expertise and that he recognized impairment. Since he did not 
have the training, nor had he passed the course, his suppositions become 
nothing more than a hunch. 
The Court on its own motion should not have allowed expert 
testimony without the necessary foundational findings. A claim of error may 
be reviewed even if there has been no objection in "exceptional 
circumstances^ The failure of the District Court to require the State to meet 
the burden necessary for Officer Issacson to testify as a Drug Recognition 
Expert is such and exceptional circumstance. The Utah Supreme Court has 
given direction in this regard: 
We note that a claim of error also may be reviewed despite the lack of 
contemporaneous objection if 'exceptional circumstances' exist. See State v. 
Verde, 770 R2d 116, HI (Utah 1989); State v. Bell 770 R2d 100, 105-06 
(Utah 1988). 
95 E3d 1193; State v. Rothlisberger; 2004 UT App 226 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
%9 Rothlisberger argues that the trial court erred in admitting Chief Adair's 
testimony regarding the significance of the quantity of methamphetamme 
found in Rothlisherger's pants. We review decisions relating to the 
qualification of a witness as an expert or as a lay witness for an abuse of 
discretion. See Hardy v. Hardy, 776R2d917, 925 (Utah Ct App. I989).( 
f 11 Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, lay witness testimony Is defined as 
testimony that Islfrationally based on the perception of the witness,11 Utah R. 
Evid. 701, while expert testimony is testimony that Is based on^sclentlfie, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge.11 Utah R. Evid. 702. There have 
been multiple Utah cases that have discussed the question of whether a 
witness may be classified as an expert for the purposes of testifying about a 
particular subject. See, e.g., Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.. 2003 
UT 57,f25, 84P.3dll54; Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115,ff 52-86, 6! 
P.3d 1068. The question before us today, however, is not whether the State 
could have offered expert testimony regarding this subject, but rather 
whether that subject is so specialized that the State must first qualify its 
witness as an expert before the trial court can properly admit testimonial 
opinion regarding it. 
The Rothlisberger Court announced the rule that Utah will follow regarding 
the use of expert testimony. 
To avoid opening the door for such results, we think it clear that when a 
witness seeks to testify regarding matters that are necessarily based on that 
witness's" scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge,ff that witness must 
be qualified as an expert under rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, and 
all reliability, reporting, or otherwise applicable statutory commands must 
then be followed with respect to that testimony,(fti4) 95 P3d 1193; State v. 
Rothlisberger; 2004 UT App 226 
The following case also provides direction on the admissibility of expert 
testimony, 
61 R3d 1068; ALDER v. BAYER CORP., AGFA DIV.; 2002 UT 115,1083 
IV. ADMISSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
A. Legal Tests of Admissibility Under Rule 702 and Rimmasch 
f 56 Utah Rule of Evidence 702 establishes the general standard for 
admissibility of expert testimony, providing that 
[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
n 
trier effect to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, 
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience. 
training, or education, may testify thereto In the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
Utah R. Evid 702.(fhl5) In Rimmasch 775 R2d 388 (Utah 1989), we 
further elaborated "the standard by which the admissibility of expert 
scientific testimony is to be judged," Id at 399. Such a standard is necessary 
because science in the court is a two-edged sword. While often helpful 
scientific testimony also has the potential to overawe and confuse, and even 
to be misused for that purpose. Consequently, jurisprudential history reveals 
a consistent attempt to ensure the reliability and helpfulness of evidence 
while allowing a maximum of relevant Information to flow to the finder of 
fact. 
f 57 In Rimmasch we rejected exclusive use of the general acceptance test 
set forth in Frye v, United States\ 293 R 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). Rimmasch 
775 P.2d at 396—99. Instead, we adopted the reasoning of Phillips v. 
Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980), approving inherent reliability rather 
than general acceptance as "the touchstone of admissibility." Rimmasch 775 
R2d at 396. Although ma showing of general acceptance w^ould generally be 
sufficient1 to show inherent reliability and to justify the admission of 
scientific evidence," general acceptance was no longer the "sine qua non of 
admission." Id at 396-97 (quoting Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1234). In the 
absence of general acceptance, other proofs of reliability could also suffice. 
We expressed confidence that "the more flexible tmt articulated in Phillips 
seems fully capable of performing the necessary screening function without 
unduly impeding the flow of reliable scientific evidence to the fact finder." 
Id at 397 n. 6. 
And finally, in order to provide expert testimony, the proper 
foundation must be laid by the State with the findings and conclusions of 
the trial court set forth. See: 
State v. Draper; 2006 UT App 6 2006 P.3d (2006 UT App 6); 
f 10 We see no admissible evidence in support of this finding. Although 
Barnes made several references to marijuana passing Into breast milk and on 
to a nursing Infant, the question of whether marijuana was actually present 
in Draper's breast milk when she nursed her Infant(fn2) appears to be of 
sufficient scientific complexity as to be fffbeyond the realm of common 
experienced1 State v. Rothiisberger, 2004 UT App 226,f26, 95 P3d 1193 
(citation omitted), cert, granted, 106R3d743 (Utah 2004) (holding that 
police chiefs testimony regarding the significance of the quantity of 
methamphetamine found was necessarily based on scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge, and was therefore properly classified as expert 
testimony). As such, the presence of marijuana and T.D.'s resulting exposure 
must be shown by Hthe type of testimony that a witness could offer only if 
first qualified as an expert." Id. at f26; see also Utah R. Evid. 701, 702 
(governing expert testimony); Reeves v. Geigy Pharm., Inc., 764 R2d 636, 
640 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (requiring expert medical testimony to establish 
that defendant's pharmaceuticals caused plaintiffs skin condition); 
Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 R2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) (requiring expert medical testimony to show that drug caused injury). 
And at head note 12 
f 12 Barnes might have qualified as an expert on this issue based on her 
experience and training as a DCFS investigator, but the State offered no 
foundation for her potential expertise at Drapers preliminary hearing. See 
Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226 at f 24 (ffIt is well settled that witnesses can 
be qualified as experts not only on the basis of formal educational training, 
but also on the basis of their own personal or vocational experiences.11); see 
also Utah R. Evid. 702, Without a foundation for her expertise, Barnes 
cannot be considered an expert witness in this case. Accordingly, the trial 
court erred when it relied on her lay opinion to support its finding of 
probable cause that Draper exposed T.D. to marijuana by nursing T.D. on 
January 20. 
Conclusion 
The Appellant herein seeks a ruling from this Court reversing the trial 
court's refusal to suppress evidence against him. Dismissing the case or 
remanding it for further proceedings as may be appropriate. Such other and 
further relief as is just and appropriate. 
Respectfully submitted this _S_ day of July, 2006. 
Cleve Hatch Attorney for 
Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant, upon the Plaintiff/Appellee by placing two true and 
correct copies thereof in an envelope addressed to Mark Shurtleff, Attorney 
General, Fredric Voros Jr. Assistant Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 this 3~"day 
of July, 2006. 
Cleve Hatch 
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ADDENDUM A MINUTES SUPPRESSION HEARING 
EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT - VERNAL COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JOHN LEE HOGUE, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SUPPRESSION HEARING 
NOTICE 
Case No: 021800277 FS 
Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON 
Date: April 17, 2003 
PRESENT 
Clerk: candaceh 
Prosecutor: G. MARK THOMAS 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOHN C. BEASLIN 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 27, 1963 
Video 
Tape Number: JRA2 0 8 Tape Count: 1:33 
CHARGES 
1. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 1st Degree Felony 
2. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor 
3. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - Class B Misdemeanor 
HEARING 
Officer Leonard Isaacson takes the oath and testifies. The 
defendant takes the oath and testifies. The Court hears the 
arguments of counsel. The Court makes the following findings. The 
Court finds there was no reason to stop the 
vehicle, but it was a voluntary stop as the defendant stopped when 
the officer motioned to him. It was after the stop that the officer 
saw signals that concerned him, and at that point, he was justified 
to continue. The Court denies the motion 
to suppress. The Court sets this case for status on April 30, 
Page 1 
Case No: 021800277 
Date: Apr 17, 2003 
2003, at 9 a.m. 
Length: 1 1/2 hrs. 
SUPPRESSION HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 04/30/2003 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: ROOM 2 
Vernal District Court 
92 0 East Hwy 4 0 
Vernal, UT 84078 
before Judge JOHN R. ANDERSON 
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ADDENDUM B MINUTES JURY TRIAL 
EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT - VERNAL COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
JOHN LEE HOGUE, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
JURY TRIAL 
NOTICE 
Case No: 021800277 FS 
Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON 
Date: August 25, 2003 
PRESENT 
Clerk: candaceh 
Prosecutor: G. MARK THOMAS 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOHN C. BEASLIN 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 27, 1963 
Video 
Tape Number: JRA2 2 2 Tape Count: 8:42 
CHARGES 
1. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 1st Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 08/25/2003 Guilty 
3. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - Class B Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 08/27/2003 Guilty 
TRIAL 
The Court meets with counsel in chambers. Initially, the defendant 
is not present, but he appears in time for the jury selection. The 
Court begins selecting a jury at 9:11 a.m. in open court. Defense 
counsel has waived having a court reporter present, 
and has no objection to having the proceeding recorded by video 
tape. The oath to voir dire is administered to the jury pool, and 
the potential jurors answer the questions posed. The Court meets in 
chambers to discuss the jurors who will be dismissed 
for cause. Five jurors are dismissed for cause. At 10:43 a.m., 
back in open court, counsel executes their preemptory challenges. 
The jury is selected, and the oath is administered to those jurors 
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Case No: 021800277 
Date: Aug 25, 2003 
selected to try the case. Counsel gives opening 
statements. Following recess for lunch, counsel indicates they 
have reached a plea agreement on this case. The defendant will 
enter guilty pleas to Possession of Controlled Substance with 
Intent to Distribute, a first degree felony; and to 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs, a class B 
misdemeanor. The Court brings the jurors back in and excuses them. 
The State files an amended information. The Court explains rights 
to the defendant. The defendant understands and7 
waives his rights. A factual basis is given. As part of the plea 
agieement, the defendant's light to appeal on the suppression issue 
will be preserved. The defendant enters guilty pleas to the amended 
information. Counsel and defendant execute the 
Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate 
of Counsel in the presence of the Court. The Court will accept the 
defendant's pleas, finds they were made voluntarily, and have a 
factual basis, and the defendant's right to 
appeal the suppression issue will be preserved. The appeal can be 
pursued separately. Sentencing is set for October 28, 2003, at 10 
a.m. A PSI is ordered, The bond which was posted can continue. The 
defendant is cautioned to stay in 
better contact with his attorney. 
SENTENCING is scheduled. 
Date: 10/28/2003 
Time: 10:01 a.m. 
Location: ROOM 2 
Vernal District Court 
920 East Hwy 40 
Vernal, UT 84078 
before Judge JOHN R. ANDERSON 
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ADDENDUM C JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF COMMITTMENT 
G. Mark Thomas, #6664 
Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Telephone: (435) 781-5438 
Fax: (435) 781-5428 
;
~c o : ?nn 
BY 
JOANNE feKEP
 €
,p. RK 
-UEP1J7V 
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JOHN LEE HOGUE, 
DOB: 01/27/1963, 
Defendant. 
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER OF 
COMMITMENT 
Case No. 021800277 
Judge John R. Anderson 
(I) POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE, FIRST DEGREE FELONY 
(II) DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS 
CLASS B MISDEMEANOR 
This matter came on for sentencing on the 23rd day of 
November, 2004, before the Honorable John R. Anderson. The 
Plaintiff was represented by G. Mark Thomas, Deputy Uintah County 
Attorney. Defendant was personally present and represented by 
Counsel, John Beaslin. The Court heard statements from counsel 
for the parties, and based upon these statements and the record 
before the Court: 
The Defendant, having been convicted of or having plead 
guilty to the crime(s) of (I) POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, in violation of Section 58-
37-8 (1) (a) (iii); and (II) DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL 
AND/OR DRUGS, in violation of 41-6-44; Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended and the Court having inquired of Defendant as to 
whether he had any statement he desired to make; and no legal 
reason having been shown why judgment and sentencing should not 
be imposed; 
IT IS ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant is guilty of 
the crime(s) of (I) POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH 
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a First Degree Felony; and (II) DRIVING 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS, a Class B 
Misdemeanor; and Defendant is hereby sentenced to serve (I) FIVE 
(5) Years to Life; and (II) Six (6) months in the Utah State 
Prison. Said terms are to run concurrent with each other. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
That the Defendant is forthwith remanded to the custody of 
the Uintah County Sheriff for transportation to the Utah State 
Prison and execution of the sentence given herein. 
2 
ohn R. Anderson 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Jot^ i C. Beaslin 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, or hand 
delivered a true copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF 
COMMITMENT to John Beaslin, Attorney for Defendant, 185 North 
Vernal Ave., Vernal, UT 84078; Department of Corrections, 152 
East 100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078; Uintah County Jail, Vernal, 
Utah 84078. 
DATED this V day of t^CX. *- -, , . , 2004 :D  Y A£* ^
/ 
/ / 
3 
